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Abstract
This paper introduces a new database on Irish land bonds listed on the Dublin
Stock Exchange from 1891 to 1938: it outlines the nature of these bonds and presents
data on their size, liquidity and market returns. These government-guaranteed
bonds arose during a period when the possibility of Irish secession from the United
Kingdom appeared ever more likely, and were used to finance the transfer of land
ownership from landlords to tenants in Ireland (North & South). Movements in the
prices of these bonds can help to understand how financial markets responded to
events in the early economic and political history of the Irish Free State, including
Irish partition, Independence, Civil War and de facto default. Understanding these
issues has contemporary relevance for regions in Spain (Catalonia, Euskadi), Great
Britain (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders).
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1 Introduction
How did financial markets react to the Irish Home Rule crises, War of Independence,
Partition and Civil War? How did these markets respond to the Irish government’s
decision to ‘default’ in 1932? More generally, what were the financial implications for
Ireland of declaring political and economic independence from the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland (UK)? All these questions are central to understanding key
developments in Irish history in the early twentieth century. To provide a platform for
exploring these research questions, and filling a lacuna in the study of Irish interest rates,
this paper introduces a new database of Irish land bond prices recorded daily on the
Dublin Stock Exchange from 1891, when land bonds were first issued, to 1938, when
the Anglo-Irish trade agreement was signed.1 We describe the historical economic and
political context in which these government-guaranteed bonds arose and present some
descriptive statistics on the bonds, including their size, liquidity and market returns.
Irish land bonds arose in the nineteenth century as part of government efforts to
implement land reform, a central issue in Irish politics and political economy in the
late nineteenth century. Around that time, the UK government saw tenant ownership
as the long-term solution to problems associated with the land ownership structure
in Ireland. Successive acts of parliaments (UK and Irish Free State) enabled tenant-
farmers to purchase land from landlords. From 1891 onwards these sales were financed
by government-guaranteed bonds, but this technicality has generally been overlooked due
to the misperception that the sales were financed directly by state money (Lyons 1971,
p. 214 and Ferriter 2004, p. 368).2
Although Irish land bonds were not a significant fraction of British sovereign
obligations, their nominal value was a huge liability for the fledgling Irish economy. Even
at its peak, the ratio of the outstanding value of land bonds to the outstanding value
of British consols and exchequer bonds was only about 7 percent, and the outstanding
1 The lack of completeness in the history of Irish interest rates is evident in Homer & Sylla (2005, pp
537-538), where Irish government bond yields are not reported until 1952. Although pre-independence
issues were referred to as ‘stock’, as noted by Homer & Sylla (2005, p.181), ‘bonds were and are called
stocks’.
2 Government-guaranteed debt is not always treated as sovereign debt, but land bonds would almost
certainly be considered sovereign debt by ESA95 modern accounting standards (Eurostat 2013). See
Eurostat (2009) for an example of the technicalities and parameters that were used to determine that
some recent Irish government-guaranteed debt was not considered sovereign debt.
2
value of British government guaranteed land bonds never rose above 4 percent of British
GDP. However, we show later that the outstanding value of land bonds peaked at over 60
percent of estimated Irish GDP—and represented about 40 percent of Irish GDP at the
time of partition—a considerable financial burden even for modern emerging economies.
Repayment of land bonds remained an obligation for Ireland throughout a turbulent
period of history.3 The newly created Free State was obligated for four principal sources
of debt: Irish Republic Bond-Certificates (issued to fund the War of Independence);
Land Bonds; a share of Imperial Debt; and new issuance. Although the government
was released from its obligation to repay its share of Imperial Debt under the 1925
Confirmation of Agreement Act, the Free State remained obligated for land bond
payments.4 Initially, the new Irish government continued transfer ‘annuities’—tenant-
purchasers’ repayments of land purchase loans—to the British exchequer. However,
repayment became a politicised issue in the Free State (I.P.P. 1931) and in July 1932
the Irish government ‘failed to honour’ the repayments, resulting in a de facto default on
debt obligations (I.P.P 1932).5
Thus, with their close ties to the Irish economy and particularly the important
agricultural sector, land bond prices present several opportunities for empirical research.
First, they provide a unique opportunity to assess financial market expectations about
and reactions to political and economic developments during the formative years of the
Irish Free State.6 Second, the secession of southern Ireland from the United Kingdom
gives an opportunity to explore the potential consequences of a break-up of a politically,
fiscally and monetarily integrated polity, with contemporary relevance for regions in
Spain (Catalonia, Euskadi), Great Britain (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders). Third,
although land bonds were not issued by an autonomous region, an analysis of their prices’
comovement with colonial bonds would complement existing empirical analysis into the
3 The intention of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act was for land annuities to be ‘gifts’ to the
respective exchequers, North and South, and for land bond dividend and sinking fund payments to be
made by the Imperial Government (B.P.P. 1920). However, since the act was not implemented in the
South, only the North availed of this ‘gift’.
4 The Imperial Debt cancellation is widely believed to have been a concession for the acceptance of
the Boundary Commission Report and permanent partition (Lee 1989, p. 145 and Ferriter 2004, p. 294).
5 Tenant-purchasers were, however, not exonerated from repayments, but instead paid annuities
(halved) to the Irish exchequer (Lee 1989, p.186). Contemporaneously in 1932, efforts were made to
honour bond certificates issued in the US to fund the War of Independence (Carroll 2002, pp 84-91).
6 Fluctuations in government bond prices (yields) are frequently used to establish financial market
expectations and to illustrate commentary on state solvency and economic conditions. Over a similar
historical time period as this paper, see Mauro et al. (2006) and Ferguson (2006).
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presence of an ‘empire effect’ across colonial bonds (Ferguson & Schularick 2006). And
fourth, a study of the relationship between land bond prices and commodity prices would
deepen our understanding of land reform in agriculturally-dependent emerging economies.
Empirical research on Irish land bonds complements existing studies of other Irish
financial markets. Given the rural nature of the Irish economy, studies of land bonds
use distinctly ‘Irish’ traded securities, similar to recent studies of historical Irish equity
markets including Hickson & Turner (2008) and Grossman et al. (2013), and especially to
Ó Gráda (1994)’s study of weekly prices of Irish and British securities from 1930 to 1932,
which examined the effect the post-default Anglo-Irish Economic War had on the yield
of Irish government bonds.7 More generally, land bonds are a novel historical case study
of government guaranteed bonds that were traded during a period of extreme crises.8
The rest of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the development
and details of state-sponsored land purchase schemes in Ireland. Section 3 describes our
new data on land bonds and section 4 concludes.
2 State-Sponsored Land Purchase: 1870 to 1938
Government land policy evolved significantly during the late nineteenth century in an
effort to address the problems associated with the land ownership structure in Ireland,
at that time a central issue in politics and political economy known as the ‘Irish Land
Question’.9 Firstly, innovations to state land policy aimed to redistribute agricultural
income from landlords to tenants. Under the 1881 land act the state became an (arguably
biased) arbitrator in landlord-tenant contracts and universally reduced rents paid by
tenants. Secondly, state land policy shifted to the provision of loans to tenants to purchase
their holdings and, from 1870 onwards, the state played an active role as a mortgage
provider to the agricultural sector of the Irish economy. To finance these loans, the
7 In addition, land bonds relate to studies of the effects of debt default in the 1930s (Eichengreen
& Portes 1986, Obstfeld & Taylor 2004) and the Anglo-Irish Economic War (O’Rourke 1991, Ó Gráda
& Neary 1991). Our dataset on land bonds is particularly helpful to understand the War, as they were
central to that dispute but were not included in the data used in Ó Gráda (1994).
8 Similar case studies include sovereign bond trading during the US Civil War (Willard et al. 1996,
Brown Jr. & Burdekin 2000), World War II (Frey & Kucher 2000, Oosterlinck 2003, Frey & Waldenstrom
2004) and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (Zussman et al. 2008).
9 See Appendices A and B for an extended discussion of the motivations and development of land
policy, including the land league, the 1870 Land Act and the 1881 Land Act.
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government guaranteed land bonds that were tradeable in several markets.
In this section, we provide details on the land purchase schemes, including their size,
operation and the various obligations imposed on tenant-purchasers.10 We also set out
the contemporaneous private options for land purchase available to prospective Irish
tenant-farmers to aid our explanation of the demand for state-sponsored land purchase
schemes. Finally, we describe the financing arrangements for these schemes, in particular
the issuance of government-guaranteed land bonds.
2.1 Land purchase schemes: size and operation
A number of acts were passed between 1869 and 1934 which enabled tenants to purchase
their holdings in Ireland.11 In total, as shown in table 1, these acts led to advances worth
over £127 million to purchase almost 15 million acres on 433,395 holdings in the South
and North of Ireland.12 The same table reports that the amounts advanced varied over
the different schemes, but the third and fifth columns show that advances per acre and
per holding generally declined over the schemes. By far the largest scheme related to the
Land Act of 1903, with over twice as much advanced as the next largest scheme. More
generally, pre-partition land acts accounted for 77 percent of the funds advanced on land
purchase in Ireland and of the pre-1920 acts the 1903 act was the most significant with
74 percent of total funds advanced.
From 1881 onwards the state land purchase schemes were overseen by the Land
Commission.13 Initially all land purchase arrangements were negotiated freely between
landlords and tenants, with state bodies providing the funds to prospective tenant-
purchasers. However, the 1903 Land Act introduced an element of compulsion by giving
the state the power to force tenants to purchase land.14 Subsequent legislation introduced
compulsory purchase powers for the agencies of state-funded land purchase whereby they
had powers to compel landlords to sell their land: this was done for the explicit purpose of
transferring land ownership. Compulsory purchase of land was introduced in 1907 under
10 This section draws on the work of McLaughlin (2009).
11 There were also a number of Acts which provided loans for buildings and permanent improvements
on holdings: Bailey (1917), and Sheehan (1993).
12 The island of Ireland has almost 21 million acres of land.
13 Two other bodies also facilitated land purchase, the Congested Districts Board (CDB) established
by the 1891 Land Act and the Estates Commissioners established by the 1903 Land Act.
14 Irish land act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7.) c. 37, section 19.
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Table 1: Land purchase schemes 1869–1923: advances, acreage and holdings
Legislation Amount of Area Advances per Number of Advances peradvances (£) (acres) acre (£) holdings holding (£)
Land Acts before 1891 7,717,498 737,359 10.5 17,098 451.4
Land Acts 1891–1896 10,853,501 1,311,673 8.3 41,562 261.1
Land Act 1903 68,895,595 6,929,805 9.9 195,000 353.3
Evicted Tenants Act 1907 389,046 25,370 15.3 735 529.3
Land Acts 1909–1919 11,828,257 2,271,979 5.2 61,000 193.9
CDB Cash 1891–1920 194,005 28,482 6.8 1,000 194.0
Land Act 1923-38 27,268,954 3,655,308 7.5 117,000 233.1
Total 127,146,856 14,959,976 8.5 433,395 293.4
Note: Excludes all vendor bonuses, advances made under the Labourers (Ireland) Acts, 1906-14, and the Irish
Church Act, 1869. Also excludes land improvement investments made by the Land Commission and CDB.
Source: Commission of Inquiry into Banking, Currency and Credit 1938 and authors’ calculations
the Labourers Act and the Evicted Tenants Act and extended to wider land purchase
policy in 1909 by the Land Law Act.15
For the tenants, the obligations of the schemes varied considerably and are discussed
in detail in the next section. In general, tenant-farmers repaid their loans with regular
mortgage payment “annuities” comprising interest and principle repayments to the
administrative body responsible for collection (Land Commission).16 These annuities
were collected into a sinking fund that was used to pay bi-annual dividends and retire
some of the outstanding bonds at the discretion of the government.17
2.2 Land purchase schemes: tenant obligations
Table 2 summarizes the specific tenant obligations associated with each land act. Over
the period 1870 to 1909, the state gradually increased the portion of the mortgage it
was willing to lend from 66 percent to 100 percent. Initially, under the 1869 to 1881
acts, the state did not finance the entire purchase price, and it was up to the tenant to
15 An Act to amend the Law with respect to Small Holdings and Allotments, 1907 (7 Edw. 7), c. 54,
section 22; Evicted Tenants (Ireland) Act, 1907 (7 Edw. 7.), c. 56, section 1.; Irish Land Act, 1909 (9
Edw. 7.) c. 42, sections 43, 59 and 60. Compulsory purchase powers were a constant feature of land
purchase legislation in post-partition Ireland (Dooley 2004).
16 The term mortgage is not anachronistic as advances made under the schemes were secured on the
land, and if a borrower defaulted the land would be foreclosed. According to a contemporaneous lecturer
in land law, ‘the money is secured by what is practically a first mortgage of the tenant’s holding, with a
provision for re-payment of the debt by instalments’ (Walker 1908, p.140).
17 The performance of the land purchase account and sinking fund were published annually in British
Parliamentary Papers from 1906 until 1976: See Irish Land Purchase Fund (B.P.P. 1906, 1977).
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raise the residual capital. Tenants could potentially use their savings, take out additional
loans, or sell their assets, but it appears that only the wealthier tenants were able to take
advantage of this facility. From 1885 onwards government support of land purchase was
more prominent, and this can be seen in the increase in the percentage of the mortgage
which the state advanced to tenants. Government bodies from 1885 onwards were issuing
loans worth 100 percent of the purchase price of a given holding. This is significant as
it no longer excluded tenants who had insufficient capital, and the state was made the
primary mortgagee on the land.18
The higher coverage of the purchase price by the state was coupled with longer loan
terms, even beyond the life-expectancy of the borrower. Initial mortgage loan terms
were roughly half those under later land acts. The land acts from 1903 onwards did
not specify a definite term for a loan but instead stated that ‘the purchase annuity shall
be paid until the whole of the advance, in respect of which it is payable, is ascertained
in manner prescribed by the Treasury to have been repaid.’19 In the case of the Free
State acts the Minister for Finance decided ‘the manner and at the times’ which the loan
would amortize. In all cases the amortisation of loans was based upon the performance
of the sinking fund. The 1903 and 1909 acts issued loans with terms of 68.5 and 66 years.
Indeed, it is very likely that the loan term would have been greater than the borrower’s
life expectancy.20 Thus the average tenant-purchaser with a mortgage term of 66 or 68.5
years would have bequeathed both the land (farm) and the loan to the next generation.21
As the intermediary between the tenant-purchasers and financial markets, the
government used its reputation to borrow capital on behalf of the tenant-purchasers
on favourable terms. The government could offer competitive rates to borrowers and
still earn a spread on the cost of capital (the difference between columns 4 and 5 in
table 2). Between 1869 and 1896 land purchase annuities were around 4.5 percent,
competitive with the best available market rates. Some evidence on private mortgages
in the early twentieth century suggests that rates charged for mortgages were between
18 Stipulations in the acts restricted the amount that other mortgagees, namely private mortgage
lenders, could place on the land. Irish Land Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7.), c. 37, section 54, sub-section 2.
19 Irish Land Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7.), c. 37, section 45, sub-section 2.
20 The percentage of the Irish population that was over the age of 35 in 1901 and 1911 was 34 and 38
percent respectively. According to British life tables, 35 year old males would have been expected to live
another 31 and 32 years in 1901 and 1911 respectively: ONS (Decennial Life Tables - Period expectations
of life from English Life Tables: Nos. 1 to 16.
21 For a discussion on intergenerational inheritance see Guinanne (1997, pp 146-151).
8
4 and 10 percent (B.P.P. 1914, paragraph 823, p. 357). Further evidence from building
societies in 1872 confirmed that interest rates on mortgages ranged from 4.5 to 7 percent
(McLaughlin 2013a). Moreover, the differential between the rates paid and prevailing
long-term interest rates decreased under the various acts. As long-term interest rates
increased during the war, the relatively low interest rates paid by those purchasing under
the 1903 and 1909 acts became even more attractive because their fixed rates were well-
below market rates.
The 1903 Land Act stated that ‘every advance shall be repaid’ and repayment was
supposed to be in accordance with the terms outlined in table 2.22 However, in the
long run, tenant-purchasers in the Irish Free State did not have to fully meet their debt
obligations, as the terms of repayment were ‘fundamentally altered’ (I.P.P. 1934). This
is because the 1933 Land Act permanently reduced all annuity payments by in the Free
State by 50 percent and also cleared arrears of defaulting purchasers under the pretext
that tenant-purchasers were overburdened by their debt.23 The effect of the halving of
the annuities can be seen in table 3 where land bonds, no longer covered by annuities are
classified as ‘deadweight debts’ (I.P.P. 1938, p. 311).
2.3 Land purchase schemes: private alternatives
Without state intervention there would have been no alternative means to purchase land
on such a scale for the majority of borrowers. The lending models of contemporary
financial institutions, namely Loan Fund Societies, Joint Stock Banks (JSBs) and
Raiffeisen (agricultural credit) societies, were based on personal security, with only limited
terms available to tenant-farmers due to the risk of death. Private individuals who
typically used solicitors as intermediaries did offer mortgages, but their availability was
not widespread (B.P.P. 1914, paragraph 883, p. 361). Moreover, evidence from the 1914
report on agricultural credit suggests that only the wealthier farms had access to such
mortgages. Curtis (1980, p. 339-341) acknowledges that landlords with large and wealthy
estates could easily obtain private mortgages in the period before 1877, as land (mortgage
loans) was deemed to have been the ‘soundest possible investments’.24
22 Irish land act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7.) c. 37, section 45, sub-section 1.
23 Land Act, 1933/38 [Éire], sections 12-27.
24 Guinnane & Miller argue that the 1903 and 1909 land acts reduced the capitalisation of mortgage
land for purchasers compared with the traditional ‘tenant right’. However, they do not elaborate on who
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As the majority of farms in Ireland were very small, they would not have been able
to access private mortgage funding to purchase land, and if they were the terms would
not have been as generous as those of the state.25 The 1914 report on agricultural
credit compared the situation in Ireland with that on the continent where mortgaging
of smallholdings was more prevalent (B.P.P. 1914, pp 334-338). However, cooperative
building societies were not found in provincial towns in Ireland, but some building
societies, most notably the ICS, made loans throughout island (McLaughlin 2013a).
Furthermore, cooperative banks did not make long-term mortgages as they did on the
continent and savings banks in Ireland did not issue loans (McLaughlin 2013b, Colvin &
McLaughlin 2013).
JSBs in Ireland were reluctant to make long-term loans on mortgage security. This
was due to a number of complications, mainly the risk associated with long-term lending,
illiquidity of landed assets, and the cost of determining property rights.26 Illiquidity of
loans backed by land was common at the time, since there was no ability to securitize
such loans, which was a challenge to risk management given the banks’ liability structure
and the absence of a central bank with lender of last resort powers.27 There was also
the problem of sale of land in the event of default, and in Ireland this was a significant
deterrent to the entry of the JSBs in the mortgage market. This became obvious in the
1926 banking commission as evidence was shown that the sale of foreclosed land was
difficult due to social pressure on buyers (I.P.P. 1926-27, pp 21-22). Therefore, mortgage
assets were practically worthless if a borrower defaulted on loan repayments.
State entry into the mortgage market was a novel approach to solving the lack of
mortgage providers were as they clearly show that Joint Stock Banks did not engage in mortgage lending
(Guinnane & Miller 1997, table 3, p. 603, 605-606).
25A mortgage advertisement appeared in Thom’s Directory in 1881 for ‘ £10,000 and upwards
on fee-simple landed properties’ with interest ranging between ‘four to four and a half percent’.
(‘Advertisement of J.A. O’Suillivan, Insurance, Mortgage and Investments offices’, Thom’s Directory
1881, p. 39.) Advances were made on ‘on fee-simple landed properties...Mortgages of life interests,
Reversions, Leasehold, and other approved Security’. Although one advertisement is not representative
of all mortgage lenders, this advertisement gives an indication of the services that mortgage providers
offered.
26 Registration of deeds and titles were not kept in an orderly fashion and it is reported that it would
take days and weeks to search for specific deeds and titles, i.e. a high cost. This cost could be reflected
in a high opportunity cost if the individuals performed the search themselves, or in the form of a direct
cost if they hired a solicitor to do the search.
27 The Bank of Ireland was ostensibly a central bank and could have acted as a lender of last resort,
but its role in the collapse of the Munster Bank suggests that it was not a willing lender of last resort
(Ó Gráda 2003, 2012).
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credit available to would-be tenant-purchasers. State mortgage loans seem to have been
based on a policy of social entitlement, disregarding the commercial considerations that
caused private lenders to hesitate. Figure 1 illustrates the effectiveness of government
intervention in the land market: In 1906 only a small share of tenant-farmers were owners
of their land, but by 1917 a large share of the tenant-farmers of Ireland were owners of
their land. This was especially pronounced in the west and south-west of the island.
Figure 1: Land owners as a percentage of landholdings: 1906 and 1917
Source: B.P.P. (1908a) and B.P.P. (1921)
2.4 Land purchase schemes: tenant demand
In the absence of private alternatives to the attractive terms and accessibility offered by
the land purchase schemes, it is unsurprising that there was keen interest from prospective
tenant-purchasers. Indeed, it appears that the appetite for the the generous terms on
offer under 1903 Land Act was underestimated, with the Land Commission understaffed
and unable to deal with the demand. Initially there were not enough funds available
to purchase holdings, which in turn created a backlog of cases; £5,000,000 was made
available per annum but the demand exceeded this amount (Cosgrove 2008, p.148).
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Nevertheless, despite their apparent appeal, some contemporary opinion seems to have
been hesitant about borrowing funds from ‘London’. For example, Cosgrove (2008, pp
162-163) stated that there were ‘...doubts held by some tenants who perhaps realised
that a government in Dublin or London would not be influenced as easily as the local
landlord. Unlike a benevolent landlord, the government would demand that land purchase
annuities be paid in full and on time, no matter how good or bad an agricultural year had
been’. However, in reality democratically elected governments can be influenced, based
upon the fact that the borrowers are also voters. The extent of voter power determines
the influence on the elected representative bodies. The scale of influence of the Irish
voters to revise their debt obligations and cancel arrears in a UK legislative assembly
would not be the same as the case where the Irish electorate have their own assembly,
dominated by agrarian interest groups. The same cannot be said of landlords who would
have been under no direct political pressure, vis-á-vis an electoral mandate, to reduce
rents, although a landlord may have been sympathetic to a tenant’s plight and granted
some respite. This is also a key distinction between a public and private lender; private
lenders would not have any political obligations to alter loan repayments. Loans could
be renegotiated in order to minimise losses, but private lenders would not be as willing
as the state to completely absolve debt obligations, especially on a grand scale.
2.5 Land purchase schemes: financing
From 1891 to 1909, state purchases under the land acts were financed by the issue of
government-guaranteed land bonds and were not financed out of UK exchequer funds.28
John Edward Vernon, a governor of the Bank of Ireland, was one of the first people
to suggest that the government raise money for land purchase through the issue of
government-backed bonds (B.P.P 1882, Q. 4191-4193). Vernon viewed the fact that there
was a large amount of money held on deposit in the JSBs as evidence ‘that there is an
element of wealth there which might be tapped and applied to the purposes of the Land
Commission’ (B.P.P 1882, Q. 4192). When he was asked what he considered would be
‘the effect of bonds of that kind would be upon the general state of Ireland, if held by the
28 This is a key distinction between the limited Highland land reforms in Scotland and those in Ireland,
as Scottish Crofter Acts were imitations of the 1881 land act and did not extend land purchase schemes
á la the 1891 and 1903 land acts (Cameron 1996, 37-38).
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people of that country?’ he replied that he thought the effect ‘would be very favourable
to the stability of the government, and the peace and order of the country (B.P.P 1882,
Q. 4214).’ Vernon also suggested that the issuance of land bonds would restore order to
the countryside as the bonds would ‘connect them with the primary security on which
they would be charged, viz. the land itself, that is, the land sold to the occupiers’ (B.P.P
1882, Q. 4215). Such a means of raising funds to finance mortgage lending was not an
option to the private market in Ireland, and as such capital would have to be raised
elsewhere.
The land purchase schemes began to issue bonds to fund payments in 1891. The
initial bonds were issued with a coupon rate of 23/4 percent,29 increased to 3 percent
under the 1909 act30 and further increased to 41/2 percent under land acts in the Irish
Free State and Northern Ireland in the 1920s and reduced to 4 percent under the 1934
land act in the Free State.31 Under the 1891 and 1896 acts, vendors (landlords) were
paid only in government-guaranteed land stock.32 Landlords could then sell these bonds
in the market or retain the bonds and receive the bi-annual dividend on the stock.33
This structure of financing land purchase by the issue of government-backed bonds
was not sustainable. Consols traded below par after 1900, and each subsequent issue of
land bonds was sold below par.34 Evidence from the Runciman report in 1908 suggests
that there was a significant divergence between the Consol price and the price for the
guaranteed land stock (B.P.P. 1908b). This seems to have been caused by the amount
of land stock issued between 1903 and 1908, and the fact that there were no new Consol
issues after 1902 (B.P.P. 1908c, p. 11). This meant that there was a shortfall in the
finances which the Runciman report estimated would be around £20 million over the 68.5
29 Purchase of land (Ireland) Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict.) c. 48, section 1, and Irish land act, 1903 (3
Edw. 7.) c. 37, section 28.
30 Irish land act, 1909 (9 Edw. 7.) c. 42, section 1.
31 Land Act 1923, no. 43 [Éire], sections 1, 2, 9, 30; Northern Ireland Land Act 1925, (15 & 16 Geo.
5.), c. 34 [UK], sections 1, 3; Land Act 1933, no. 38 [Éire]; Land Bond Act 1934, no. 11 [Éire], section 6.
32 Purchase of land (Ireland) Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict.) c. 48, section 1.
33 The 1903 act allowed for payment in cash, raised through the sale of stock, because the market
price for the bonds was typically below par after 1900. In addition, the act introduced a land purchase
aid fund of £12 million to be distributed to landlords ostensibly to cover legal costs involved in sales,
but widely perceived as an inducement to encourage landlords to sell.
34 The average issue price of stock under the 1903 land act was £88.71 (B.P.P. 1908b). So, for example,
each £100 issue would be sold for £90, which used to fund land purchase. But the tenant-farmer only
received a loan for £90 and thus the expected repayment implied a deficit of 10 percent (ignoring the
small interest spread) which had to be met by some external source of finance, namely taxpayers.
14
years of the 1903 act, on the assumption that the market prices were constant (B.P.P.
1908c, paragraph 38, p. 7). However, deficiencies in stock issues were to be met from
the Irish development grant, probate duty grants and agricultural grants administered
under the 1898 local government act.35 The fact that the programme was financially
unsustainable effectively meant that the purchasers of land under the government land
purchase schemes actually received their farms under concessional terms of state-subsidy.
Figure 2: Nominal value of land bonds as a share of GDP
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The lack of sustainability in the programme should not have been a major concern for
investors, since the nominal value of the land bonds was a small fraction of the British
economy. Based on records from our dataset (discussed in the next section), figure 2
shows that the outstanding nominal value of British government guaranteed land bonds
never rose above 4 percent of UK GDP. By contrast, figure 3 shows that at the time
that Ireland gained independence, land bonds were worth about 40 percent of estimated
Irish GDP.36 Moreover, the newly formed state continued to issue land bonds, with the
35 Irish land act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7.) c. 37, section 38.
36Given that no annual Irish GDP series exists (Cullen 2007), the GDP denominator in figure 3
is estimated from Maddison (2001, 2003) data using the 1913 share of the Irish economy in the UK
economy. Also, as Northern Ireland was included in the land purchase schemes it is also included in the
denominator.
15
oustanding nominal amount peaking almost 60 percent of GDP in the early 1930s, a
considerable burden for any developing economy. Thus, data on land bond prices provide
an excellent opportunity to evaluate investors’ perspectives on Irish land (collateral for
the loans) and the early political and economic development of Ireland.
Figure 3: Nominal value of all land bonds as a share of estimated Irish GDP
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3 Data description
The source for our data is the daily stock and share records of the Dublin Stock Exchange
held in the National Archives of Ireland, Dublin.37 We collected data from 1890 through
to 1938, covering the first issuance of bonds under the 1891 land act through to the
Anglo-Irish trade agreement. In particular, we obtained records of daily closing prices
and amounts outstanding for all government-guaranteed debt traded on the Dublin Stock
Exchange.38 For each bond, we roll forward the observed last price to create a panel of
37Dublin Stock Exchange, BI 3/32 to BI 3/79.
38The Dublin Stock Exchange was formally established in 1799 when ‘thirteen brokers were licensed
to deal in government securities’ (Thomas 1986, p.55). Regional stock exchanges formed later in the
nineteenth century, first in Cork in 1886 and later in Belfast in 1897 (Thomas 1986, p. 151 & p.223).
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last prices on every day the exchange was open from the first time the bond is traded until
the last day that the bond is recorded in the exchange records. The exchange was open
Monday-Friday (and Saturday in some years) excluding public holidays such as Easter
and Christmas. The stock exchange was closed from August to December 1914, due to
the War, and also briefly due to a financial crisis in 1931 (Thomas 1986, p.68).
Although London was the pre-eminent financial trading centre of the time, we use
Dublin Stock Exchange data because not all land bonds were traded in London (Thomas
1986, p.170). That said, stock markets in London and Dublin were closely integrated
during our period of study. The installation of a direct telegraph connection between
Dublin and London in 1850 ensured information lagged at most one day, and the telephone
was introduced in 1897.39 Therefore, closing prices in Dublin should be reasonably close
to those in London throughout our data.
3.1 Dublin Stock Exchange: sovereign debt records
Table 4 lists the land bonds, consols, exchequer bonds and Free State bonds recorded in
our database by order of issuance date. For brevity, we do not list the colonial bonds
(India, Transvaal), war stocks or unusual securities (trading in small lots, interest due
next gale, instalments, etc) that are also present in our data.40 In addition, as part
of our data cleaning, we exclude bonds that were priced on the exchange for less than
250 trading days (roughly one year). There are six land bonds, six bonds that we term
‘benchmark’ UK sovereign debt and four Irish Free State bonds. The second column in
the table reports the coupon associated with each issue, using the ‘average’ coupon for
the consolidated stock converted in 1903 from 2.75 percent to 2.5 percent.41
The first four land bonds, including bonds issued by the Free State in the 1920s (B.P.P
1924,-, B.P.P. 1924-25b, 1929-30, 1930-31), carried British government guarantees, while
the last two were issued under the Land Bond Acts of 1933 and 1934 without such a
guarantee.42 In addition, the land bonds issued under the 1933 and 1934 acts were the
39 The telegraph connection was temporarily lost in 1914, but the telephone remained operational
(Thomas 1986, p. 92).
40 In the early part of our period, consols and exchequer bonds constituted the general debt issued by
the British treasury, while colonial stocks (India and Transvaal) and war stocks were used to raise funds
for specific purposes.
41 The 1903 conversion of the consolidated stock had been planned from the National Debt (Conversion)
Act of 1888.
42 The latter two land bonds were guaranteed by the Irish government, which also inherited
17
Table 4: Dublin Stock Exchange: sovereign debt
Coupon Coverage Window Max Issuance Liquidity
% First Date Last Date £m Measure
Land bonds
Gtd. land stock, red. 1921 2.75 1892/7/27 1938/12/30 13.20 .31
Gtd. land stock from 1903 land act 2.75 1904/7/19 1938/12/30 57.26 .33
Gtd. land stock from 1903/09 land act 3 1910/12/19 1938/12/30 71.50 .33
41/2 pct Land Bonds 4.5 1926/1/20 1938/12/30 24.88 .85
41/2 pct New Land Bonds 4.5 1934/2/8 1938/12/30 .59 .24
4 pct Land Bonds (land bond act 1934) 4 1934/10/26 1938/12/30 2.81 .52
UK Consols and Exchequer bonds
Consolidated stock, converted in 1903 2.57 1890/1/2 1938/12/30 592.41 .81
2.5 pct stock, red. 1905 2.5 1890/1/2 1938/9/26 33.22 .08
2.75 pct stock, red. 1905 2.75 1890/1/9 1938/9/26 4.65 .02
Exchequer bonds, red. 1905 3 1901/11/21 1905/12/6 14 .16
Exchequer bonds, red. 1909 3 1905/6/15 1909/10/13 6 .01
Exchequer bonds, red. 5 Apr 1915 3 1913/3/12 1915/7/15 21 .01
Irish Free State bonds
National loan 5 1924/1/8 1935/11/27 10 .86
Second National loan 5 1928/1/3 1938/12/30 7 .79
Third National loan 4.5 1930/6/11 1938/12/30 6 .62
Fourth National loan 3.5 1933/12/20 1938/12/30 6 .70
Source: authors’ calculations
first not to be expressed in sterling but were instead expressed in Free State currency
(I.P.P. 1938, paragraph 40, p. 14).
From independence onwards, bonds issued by the Free State government (including
the four National Loans listed in table 4) take precedence over imperial funds, as evidenced
by the placement of Free State government funds above British funds on the daily stock
exchange listings.43
The third and fourth columns in table 4 report the time window in our database over
which the bonds were priced on the Dublin Stock Exchange. The six land bonds remain
in the daily record book until the end of 1938, implying coverage of the entire period.
Similarly, the large issue of consolidated stock, the 21/2 percent stock, the 23/4 percent
stock and the four Irish Free State bonds cover most of our sample period, making the
prices of these bonds useful as benchmark comparators for land bond price movements.
The fifth column of the table reports the maximum recorded amount outstanding for
responsibility for collecting annuities to repay the previous four land bonds. These government guarantees
made the bonds de facto sovereign debt, even though land bonds were typically issued by the body
responsible for overseeing the land purchase scheme (Land Commission).
43The British treasury in 1920 wanted to transfer the register of government debt held by the Bank
of Ireland from Dublin to Belfast. However, an agreement was reached whereby only the holdings of
northern Irish bondholders were transferred to Belfast; Dublin kept its existing stock holdings but no
new UK issues featured on the Dublin market (Thomas 1986, p. 130).
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each bond, illustrating the large size of the consolidated stock relative to all other bonds
traded on the Dublin Stock Exchange. This column also shows how large the inherited
burden of land bonds was relative to the size of new issuance for the Irish Free State.
Unfortunately, neither bond trade volumes nor bid-ask spreads are reported in the
stock market records. However, since we have relatively high-frequency data, we can
create a proxy liquidity measure, reported in the sixth column of the table, by calculating
the fraction of days on which trading occurred when the bond was priced in the market.
Although this proxy may be computed over subsamples (see table 5) it cannot be used to
infer anything about the liquidity of an issue at a point in time. According to this proxy,
land bond liquidity on the Dublin Stock exchange compared favourably with the majority
of exchequer bonds. In particular, the liquidity of the final British-guaranteed land bond
appears on a par with that of the consolidated stock, consistent with the assessment
of Thomas (1986, p. 170) that the sterling guarantee combined with quotation on the
London Stock Exchange made this bond “always a big attraction” in the inter-war period.
As consols are the longest living and have the largest amount outstanding in our data, it
is not surprising that they are found to be highly liquid in our dataset. By contrast, the
21/2 percent and 23/4 percent stocks are quite illiquid, even relative to the land bonds.
In summary, reading across our statistics on coverage, issuance volume and liquidity,
we find that the best benchmarks for land bond price movements are the movements in
the prices of UK consols.
3.2 Dublin Stock Exchange: sovereign bond prices
Figures 4 and 5 show on the same scale from 1890 until 1938 (i) the prices of land bonds
and (ii) UK consols and exchequer bonds listed in table 4. To avoid confusion, these
bond prices are shown on separate figures but aligned so that their general evolution can
be compared.
The broad movements in the prices of land bonds and UK consols and exchequer bonds
are similar and are consistent with the major events of the time (Homer & Sylla 2005, pp
438-450). Both series steadily decline from the middle of the final decade of the nineteenth
century until the early 1920s, partly in response to the war, but mostly to developments
in fiscal and social policy. Prices remained low throughout the 1920s as the government
19
Figure 4: Land bonds: last prices
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Figure 5: Consols and Exchequer bonds: last prices
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strove to restore sterling’s reputation as a strong currency. The sharp upward movement
late in 1931 is also well-known and attributable to the UK government’s decision to
abandon the gold standard (Homer & Sylla 2005, p.451).
Although the broad movements in the price series are similar, some of the more
detailed activity in land bond prices is different from that of UK consols and exchequer
bonds. First, there is more volatility in the land bond prices than in consols and exchequer
bonds around the time of Irish partition and civil war (1921-1923). Second, the movement
in land bond prices appears more muted, in particular the large issues of 1903/09 land
bonds and the 4.5 percent land bonds. And, thirdly, while land bonds were at times
viewed as unpopular, their prices above par towards the end of our data indicate that
they had become more attractive even than consols, despite the risk that the bonds might
have been called for redemption (Thomas 1986, p.170).44 Descriptive statistics of bond
returns over different sub-periods can help to clarify these observations.
3.3 Dublin Stock Exchange: sovereign bond returns
Table 5 presents summary statistics for land bond returns and UK consols and exchequer
bond returns over the entire period and for seven sub-samples, using the time series
of last observed prices described in the previous section.45 For each bond, in addition
to the number of observations and the average returns in each sub-sample, we report
the standard deviation of returns as a measure of volatility during each period and our
liquidity measure (the fraction of days on which trading took place). Average returns
are consistently near-zero across bonds and subsamples, as is common in studies of daily
returns (Brown & Warner 1985).
During the early sub-samples, consols are by far the most liquid bond and the
exchequer bonds are traded only modestly. Land bonds were traded more frequently than
exchequer bonds and remained relatively liquid during World War I. Moreover, while the
44 In a 1909 parliamentary debate, William Moore, a Unionist M.P. for Antrim North (Hourican 2009),
stated that land bonds, which he termed “Bog Stock”, were not popular with timid investors and were
being issued at a discount to landowners, who could only sell them in the market for a further discount.
Hansard, HC Deb 23 July 1909, vol 8 cc749-93.
45The seven periods correspond to an ex-ante expectation of variation in financial market behaviour
towards land bonds: (1) Jan 1890—Aug 1903 : pre-Land Act of 1903; (2) Aug 1903—Jul 1914 : pre-
World War I; (3) Jul 1914—Nov 1918 : World War I; (4) Nov 1918—Dec 1921 : war of independence;
(5) Dec 1921—Sep 1929 : post-Irish independence; (6) Sep 1929—Dec 1931 : Great Depression; (7) Jan
1932—Dec 1938 : post-Great Depression.
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liquidity of consols declined significantly after 1920, some land bonds were traded more
frequently towards the end of the period. The analysis by sub-period confirms the overall
finding that the 4.5 percent land bonds were particularly popular during the interwar
period. However, there was a decline in liquidity for the other three British government-
guaranteed land bonds. This may in part reflect a migration of trading into markets that
listed a full set of British securities and were more connected to London traders (Thomas
1986).
Although land bond returns and UK consols and exchequer bond returns display
similar volatility over the entire sample, there is considerable variation across sub-samples
from World War I onwards. To explore this variation further, figure 6 shows the standard
deviation of the weighted average of these returns computed using a rolling window of
three years (750 days) around each date on the horizontal axis.46 A similar figure is
obtained when using one-year or five-year windows, or when only the days on which
trading takes place are used to calculate the standard deviation.
Figure 6: Weighted average bond returns: volatility
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46 The weights are the oustanding nominal value of each bond in the category. Since consols have a
large outstanding nominal value, the ‘British government bond’ series is de-facto that of consols.
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According to figure 6, land bonds and British government bonds experienced similar
broad movements in return volatility throughout the sample. However, around the time
of the outbreak of World War I, British government bonds became more volatile than
land bonds. After appearing to converge during the early 1920s, the two series again
diverged during the Great Depression and land bonds remained less volatile than British
government bonds for the remainder the period. In addition, the volatility of land bonds
remains elevated during the Irish war of independence while the volatility of British
government bonds declines. These facts suggest that land bonds were reacting to Irish
specific events, perhaps including developments in the value of collateral (Irish land) and
the turbulent political events surrounding indepedence.
4 Concluding remarks
Land reform, purchase and ownership are central issues to modern Irish history, with the
land question playing a key role in the development of Irish national and political identity
(Boyce 2005, Dooley 2004, Lyons 1971). Although the land purchase schemes described
in this paper were one of the most important tools used to address the land question, the
land bonds used to implement the schemes have yet to be fully explored. In particular,
our database is the first systematic effort to collect land bond prices. Analysing such
data permit a broader and deeper understanding of the development of Ireland at the
beginning of the twentieth century.
Moreover, while the major movements in these price series are consistent with broader
fundamentals,47 we anticipate that higher frequency movements offer a measurable
interpretation of key developments in early economic and political history of the Irish Free
State. Using as a statistical control the price movements of other sovereign bonds traded
on the Dublin Stock Exchange (discussed below), we intend to identify the historical
events that had the strongest effect on Irish financial markets.48 We have constructed
47 Obstfeld & Taylor (2003) and Bordo et al. (1999) study the determinants of credit risk separately
from exchange rate risk, but the latter is not a factor affecting price movements in our case as events
were affecting Britain and Ireland identically given Sterling denomination of debts and the orthodox
monetary policy adopted by the Irish Free State in the 1920s and 30s. As noted by The Economist (8
December 1923) the Free State did not adopt its own separate currency and ‘was in no hurry to establish
one’.
48 Morck & Yeung (2011, pp. 50-52) argue that this methodology is particularly appropriate for
gauging causation using historical data.
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a database of events based on New History of Ireland vol. 8 (Moody & Martin 1982).49
The database includes the dates of key events in the history of Ireland over the period
1890 to 1938.50
The secession of Ireland from the UK is one of only a handful of cases in which a highly
integrated sub-region has attained fiscal and political indepedence from within a sovereign
state.51 As independence movements in Scotland and Catalonia continue to develop,
questions are being asked about the fiscal legacy associated with declaring secession. A
detailed study of Irish land bonds provides an excellent platform to understand the legal
and financial consequences of independence.
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A Appendix: The 1870 Land Act and the Land League
Precedents for state-funded land purchase were established by significant acts passed in
1869 and 1870. The Irish Church Act of 1869, primarily an act which disestablished the
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Church of Ireland as a state-sponsored church in Ireland, contained clauses enabling
tenants on church lands to purchase their holdings with the aid of state-financed
mortgages.52 The 1870 land act also included land purchase clauses, whereby the state
would advance money for the purchase of a tenant’s holding.53 However, neither of these
acts had a high uptake in terms of land purchase, and of the two the 1869 act saw the
greater number of tenant purchases (Lyons 1971, p. 146).
The primary purpose of the 1870 land act was not to introduce land purchase schemes;
this was an afterthought included in the Act.54 The primary aim of the act was to reform
the existing law governing landlord tenant contracts. The 1870 land act was influenced
by a perception that agricultural investment in Ireland was impeded by an inadequate
definition of property rights. The case of the prosperity of farms in the northern counties
of Ulster was used as an example of the benefits of reform, as it was believed that Ulster’s
prosperity was caused by what was known as the ‘Ulster custom’. The Ulster custom
consisted of what were known as the ‘three F’s’. As Kennedy & Solar (2012) note:
These extra-legal rights varied from estate to estate, but often carried the
presumption that a sitting tenant could expect renewal of a lease, once it
had expired; that rents would be ‘fair’, meaning essentially lower than the
competitive or rack-rent; and that on vacating a holding he or she had the
right to sell the value of the unexpired lease to the incoming tenant. The last
could be valuable, amounting on some farms to ten times or more the annual
rent paid to the landlord, suggesting that actual rents were well below the
competitive rent level.(2012, p.174)
There was a common impression that the perceived prosperity of Ulster farming, small
tillage farming, was based on the ‘Ulster custom’. However, Vaughan has suggested that
this prosperity in Ulster may in fact have been a flax boom, caused by market dislocations
resulting from the American Civil War (the so-called ‘Cotton Famine’), as flax was a cash-
crop used at the time. Vaughan (1994) has suggested that perhaps contemporaries were
not able to distinguish between this flax boom and the customs prevailing in Ulster (1994,
52 Irish Church Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict.) c. 42, paragraphs 52-54.
53 Landlord and tenant (Ireland) act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict.) c. 46, part II.
54It is commonly known as the ‘Bright clause’, named after John Bright at whose behest provisions
for land purchase were included in the act.
32
p.82). Support for Vaughan’s argument comes from the general report of the 1871 census
where it was stated that ‘in that province [Ulster], however, throughout almost its entire
extent, the cultivation of flax is connected with the one manufacture - that of linen -
deserving to be called great (B.P.P. 1876, p.7).’
The 1870 Land Act attempted to formalise informal traditional customs in Ulster.
One of the main assumptions of the acts was that the tenancy system in Ireland was an
impediment to agricultural investment. The assumption was that tenants were unwilling
to invest in agricultural improvements because of a fear that such investment would lead
to an increase in rents or arbitrary eviction. Solow (1971) and Vaughan (1994) have
argued that this scenario did not exist, and that tenancies were relatively secure before
the 1880s. The evidence on evictions presented in McLaughlin (2009) also suggests that
there was a low probability of eviction in post-famine Ireland. Solow (1971) summarised
the situation by stating that:
...If Ireland’s economic difficulties were traceable to defects in tenure
arrangements, the Land Act of 1870 was soundly conceived and well drafted.
It was well designed to cure the evils it assumed. It would work to deter
eviction and deter landlords from raising rents on tenant improvements. But
if its assumptions were wrong, it could not hope to play a major role in
improving the economic condition of Ireland. Its success rested squarely on
the historical facts about the frequency of evictions, the course of rents, and
the nature of investment incentives. (1971, p.50)
The initial encroachment of the state in landlord-tenant relations in 1870 pre-dated
two significant events. One was a very bad harvest in the late 1870s, caused by continuous
heavy rainfall, and the second was the new world ‘grain invasion’, an increase in grain
exports from granaries in the new world (Solow 1971, O’Rourke 1997). These economic
shocks were felt across Europe and a number of countries responded by placing tariffs on
grain imports, notably France and Germany, whilst the UK and Denmark remained as
free-traders, thus increasing competition in Ireland’s traditional export markets (Koning
1994, O’Rourke 1997).55
55 Irish agriculture did receive some non-tariff protection in the form of exemption from the infectious
disease regulations on livestock that affected foreign exporters (Turner 1996, p.157).
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The combination of bad harvests in 1877 and an increase in international trade
competition meant that Irish agricultural producers experienced a sustained reduction
in farming income. Although it did not address the root causes of these problems, an
umbrella coalition of interest groups campaigning for rent reductions called the Land
League promoted social agitation against landlords.56 The Land League was attractive
to those who viewed the payment of rent as the root cause of their problems as it promised
a reduction in rents and aimed to achieve owner-occupancy of farms. The goal of land
ownership was one common to many in Irish society, regardless of land quality (Comerford
1985, p.247).
B Appendix: The 1881 Land Act
The government reacted to Land League agitation by introducing new land law
legislation.57 The 1881 Land Act was essentially a rent control act, with judicially-
determined lower rents and a Land Commission established by the act to mediate in
landlord-tenant contractual disputes. The aim of the act was to grant the tenants a ‘fair
rent’, but the policy seems to have been to reduce rents regardless of their level.58
One of the most significant aspects of the 1881 act was that it brought land purchase
schemes to greater prominence than it had been previously. The legislation made facilities
available for tenants to buy land from landlords, with purchase prices set at a number of
years rent. However, land purchase schemes failed to attract much support in their initial
phases, probably due to a view that judicial rent reductions may have been less costly
to implement than expanded land purchase schemes. Future land purchases saw tenants
purchase their holdings with the purchase price set in terms of judicially reduced rents.
Legislation subsequent to the 1881 act was specifically designed to encourage greater
transfer of ownership from landlords to their tenants, and this is immediately noticeable
from the titles of the legislation which began to be called ‘land purchase acts’.
56 Irish historiography is still somewhat divided on the issue regarding landlord-tenant relations. E.g.
Crotty (1966), Donnelly (1975), Solow (1971) and Vaughan (1994) versus Turner (1996) and Hoppen
(1999).
57 Land law (Ireland) Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict.) c. 49.
58 Donnelly (1975, pp 297-298) shows how rent reductions took place not because rents were high but
due to agitation for reductions. By 1900 aggregate rents were reduced by 22 percent in the first statutory
term and 22.15 per cent in the second statutory term (Thom’s Directory 1902).
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The institution created under the 1881 land act to mediate rent disputes, the Land
Commission, was transformed into an institution that supervised the sale of land.59
59 In Northern Ireland, the Land Commission ceased to exist under the Northern Ireland Land Purchase
(Winding Up) Act of 1935 but continued its existence in Southern Ireland, with a bill for its dissolution
only passed into law in 1999.
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